Thinking Ourselves Beyond Humanism

Abstract

Have you heard that some people wrote a story about the future? What? People can’t write a story of what hasn’t happened yet? Well, Nietzsche was also told that a philology of the future was impossible. To be precise, the new version of the Posthuman Studies Reader is not exactly a story in the historiographic sense, but rather in a relaxed sense; more that of a guide that will allow us to understand the assumptions on which we will draw to live in the near future. We find ourselves, in this sense, with a compendium capable of introducing us in the process of becoming self-aware of our limits—biological, educational, philosophical—as a human species.Structurally, this work is made up of an Anti-Prologue, an Introduction, and four sections, which I will focus on in this review. From the beginning, both in the Introduction and in the first section, “A. Pedigrees of Posthuman Studies as an Academic Discipline and Contemporary Posthuman Movements,” one may be pleased to find that progress in academic disciplines related to posthuman studies is real.It was already several years ago that Nick Bostrom presented “A History of Transhumanist Thought” (2005), and it is today that, thanks to this Reader, we can find a series of indications that allow us to expand our knowledge of the common roots not only from which transhumanist thought has emerged, but also that give birth to ways of thinking that generally seek to go beyond humanism. As the editors claim, the “pedigree” that we are able to find here does not emerge from a specific form of philosophy, but rather from a “critical posthumanism,” a “field of a gradual integration among Transhumanism, Metahumanism and Posthumanism, an evolving but firm ground, wide open to the new philosophical concepts about a less anthropocentric, less racist, more ethical and more clearly politicized future” (11). The roots of our past, then, will mark the path of our future.I cannot help but notice that the inspiration generated by the scholarly works of Stefan Lorenz Sorgner can already be found in the Introduction, and this is not surprising, since it is sufficient to look at the word “pedigrees” in the first section to understand that we are dealing with a work that is fully aware of the latest research in this field. Let us remember that Sorgner had already produced a study called “Stammbäume des Meta-, Post- und Transhumanismus,” contained in his book Transhumanismus: “Die gefährlichste idee der Welt”!? (2016), originally written in German. However, I would dare to say that the book’s first section seeks to mark the route of what I have called a history of the future rather than to make a deep and exhaustive reflection on the roots of “Critical Posthumanism,” which is fully understood as long as we, citizens of the future, also make our contribution to discover, reconstruct, and explain how is it that our humanist, classical, modern, and enlightened roots were able to generate the conditions for sensing the possibility of surpassing ourselves as a species.If we compare the names of philosophers, scientists, and scholars presented in the Introduction to Posthuman Studies Reader with the names presented by Bostrom in his “History” (2005), we will find that the keynotes that configure “critical posthumanism” go beyond humanism and rationalism. It is the presence of the “scientific cosmist,” of Nietzsche and his idea of the “overhuman,” of contemporary scientists—among which I can highlight my countryman Francisco J. Varela and the Buddhist Jon Kabat-Zinn—and representatives of feminism and the LGBTQ+ movement oriented toward posthumanism that we can say that this book is the result of long debates, and that it presents itself as a work that is coherent with the world in which we live and with the world in which we are going to live: that is, a world neither humanistic, nor Western, nor solely masculine.Following this route, we find ourselves with our first stop on the road to our future, section B, “Transhumanism” (41–136). The section begins with an excerpt from the text Knowledge, Morality, and Destiny by Julian Huxley While the text is notable for being the first publication in which the word “transhumanism” was presented, Huxley also assigned to human beings a descriptive note that we share with nature itself, namely that all reality is a process. This allows us to outline an approach to self-transformation that is wider and more universal than that of the already known humanisms. This characteristic note will be complemented by the proposal of FM-2030, who in his text “Transhumans-2000” already hints that we are “biofluid,” that is, a biological entity that can flow beyond its limitations. However, it is not until the appearance of Natasha Vita-More’s “Transhumanist Manifesto” that we are able to find a proposal to systematize the conditions that underpin the transhumanist project: (a) challenging aging; (b) enhancing and improving our bodies and brains; and (c) understanding ourselves as a life form that is not restricted by others. These conditions allow us to begin to systematize the transhumanist project as a philosophical worldview. They do not point strictly to human biological evolution, but rather refer to the need to control uncertainty in order to control perpetual progress and, consequently, achieve self-transformation into a transhuman existence. It is noteworthy that Natasha Vita-More has the intuition that a transhuman existence does not imply only adding gadgets to our bodies or designing bodies without a transdisciplinary strategy and perspective, since the transhuman cannot participate in a social existence without a perspective capable of confronting political absolutes and biases. Thus, self-transformation as such implies existing beyond modern morality, beyond an economy of scarcity and beyond discriminatory cruelty.On this basis, it is easy to understand the composition of the section. Going beyond the three elements recently mentioned implies a reflection on specific experiences of our existence. Transhumanism, as a philosophy, cannot be conceived as an a priori reflection and must confront our actual experience. David Pearce, with his manifesto “The Hedonistic Imperative,” is the first to confront us with the possibilities that nanotechnology and genetic engineering present when dealing with the experience of both physical and mental pain. Already, in 1995, Pearce detected what today is a devastating and real emergency, that global suffering should be a topic of global policy discussion. Depression, manic states, and bipolarity are mentioned by the author as examples that show contemporary health standards to be pathologically low. Nonetheless, an existence at the level of our current possibilities can take care of these health standards by developing the possibilities of not only suppressing the psychological states of euphoria, but also programming ourselves with a kind of euphoria that allows us to abandon our lugubrious present. This last possibility can only be conceived from a discussion that takes us into account not only as objects of transformation, but also as subjects capable of deciding on our transformation.In this way, Anders Sandberg’s “Morphological Freedom. Why We Don’t Just Want It, but Need It” argues for the need to extend the “personal right” to modify our bodies according to our own desires in order to pursue happiness. This right implies maximum personal autonomy, an idea that would directly confront contemporary ethical debates, namely women’s right to their own bodies, reproductive rights, or euthanasia. In this sense, morphological freedom would require a tolerant society that does not allow its ethical judgments to be clouded by paternalistic ways of relating to individuals. This morphological freedom, which implies understanding self-transformation as an ongoing process and not as an ideologically determined telos, is also an invitation to get hold of the different types of health that already exist, as in the case of disabled people who do not want to be “repaired” because they have already learned to cope and live with their own existence. In short, Morphological Freedom is a commitment not only to the notion of maximum personal autonomy, but also to a tolerant and pluralistic society.The inclusion of Fukuyama is necessary at this point in the narrative. His popular work “The World’s Most Dangerous Ideas: Transhumanism” may, in fact, kick off this whole Reader; is there a greater representative of the bioconservative than he? There may very well be, but his naïve and uncritical ideas end up strengthening authors such as Max More and his proposal of “The Proactionary Principle.” Although the intentions of people like Fukuyama may be good at their core, they are still blinded by prejudices and weak methodological approaches. In this sense, “The Proactionary Principle” is a coherent and rational response to the impossibility of denying technological progress, but also to the need to be ethically responsible for the inevitable development of science and technology.I believe that the inclusion of “Democratic Transhumanism 2.0” by James Hughes is a sufficient gesture to refute Fukuyama and, at the same time, demonstrate that the transhumanist movement is not as naive as the bioconservatives depict. Hughes’ self-awareness when characterizing the transhumanist and bioconservative discussion as another dimension of the complexity of contemporary politics is remarkable, because if a reflection seeks to match up to the height of our times, it must be able to offer a radical interpretation of democracy in order to support a coherent relationship between (a) new social possibilities brought about by emerging technologies, (b) a state policy capable of anticipating and dealing with threats from the misuse of emerging technologies without bioconservative biases, and (c) the multiplicity of perspectives involved in defending the dignity of all people who fight for the right to control their own bodies without being coerced by society to adopt ideologically “normal” bodies. This is why I believe that Hughes’s work is an incredible contribution not only to the teaching process of what transhumanism is, but also to show that if we want to think about the present, it is necessary to adopt a multiple perspective.Unfortunately, I do not agree with the inclusion of the following text. In its defense, I understand that the content is expressed in a rather literary way; however, beyond the metaphors and literary style, Nick Bostrom’s “Letter from Utopia” manifests what I consider to be a naive transhumanism. It is enough, for example, to take into account his considerations on suffering (131) to understand that, beyond the rhetoric of his approach, Bostrom’s utopian transhumanism overlooks many moments in the history of philosophy. There is much debate on suffering—from the Epicurean philosophers or Nietzsche, just to name a few—for a specialist at Bostrom’s level to present the ideas contained in his paper. Nevertheless, as I have argued throughout this review, I am more than convinced that philosophy as a discipline progresses and, in this sense, “Letter from Utopia” has allowed great scholars such as Hauskeller (2012) and Sorgner (2018) to respond to these ideas and push transhuman researchers to the limits of the question for this movement.In this sense, it appears as a great achievement to me that “Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and Transhumanism” by Stefan Lorenz Sorgner is the article that coherently connects this first section with the rest of the book. It is necessary for me to be honest and thank Professor Sorgner for inviting me to participate in this review; however, I cannot deny that it is also difficult for me to be objective with this text, as it is because of this reading that I first became familiar with transhumanism. While the article is a direct response to Bostrom’s History (2005), it also, in my view, represents an excellent exercise in pushing transhumanism out of the comfort zone of its presuppositions. The goal now is not only to overcome our condition through genetic improvement, but also to reconsider our relationship with science, values and culture. Thus, Nietzsche’s “dynamic philosophy” in Sorgner’s perspective makes it possible to coordinate a new face of transhumanism in a coherent fashion: a transhumanism that is no longer naively materialistic or scientistic. Beyond the specific content of the article, it is necessary to highlight the level and number of discussions that were born thanks to this paper. The sole mention of Nietzsche and Transhumanism: Precursor or Enemy? edited by Yunus Tuncel (2017) is enough to highlight the impact of Sorgner’s proposal in the academic field. The reception of his proposal has been diverse, with both support and criticism, but Professor Sorgner’s production has not yet concluded, and, in later works, he has even admitted “a weak Nietzschean or posthumanist version of transhumanism” (2016). I believe that it is this version of Nietzschean transhumanism that editors Sampanikou and Stasieńko had in mind when coordinating the content of this Posthuman Studies Reader, as the following sections of the book seek to exhibit an overcoming of our condition by destroying the assumptions that hold us subjected to humanist ideas. This thought could not be more Nietzschean.The next section, “C. Posthumanism” (137–278), is the longest in the book and the one that also, in my view, provides the most significant contribution to the task of expanding a notion of transhumanism that attempts to think beyond its human condition without relying exclusively on technology.I find interesting to begin by mentioning that one can find the aforementioned Nietzschean heritage already at work in the excerpts from Donna Haraway’s works. It is undeniable that one of Nietzsche’s greatest scholars clearly has something to contribute to the goal of characterizing ourselves, and Haraway senses this insofar as her “Manifesto for Cyborgs” can be understood from the biopolitical reflection of Michel Foucault. When she affirms that “The Cyborg is our ontology” (143), what is being affirmed is a decision in the face of humanist dualism. From this starting point we can no longer take as a given our dependence on dual separations (mind–body; animal–machine), but rather, just like a mythological tale, Haraway’s works are the starting point for doubting the boundaries that have ideologically determined us. And one may wonder what these boundaries are. I believe that the first question, in a primordial sense, should be “What are we?” in order to be able to understand what is at stake when we ask ourselves about the meaning of the posthuman. I think that N. Katherine Hayles recognizes this methodological step when she says that “human being is first of all embodied being, and the complexities of this embodiment mean that human awareness unfolds in ways very different from those of intelligence embodied in cybernetic machines” (163). With this in mind, rather than an anti-human perspective, one should create perspectives capable of understanding ourselves as the result of historical evolutionary processes that do not end in the use of technological prostheses but culminate in a different understanding of ourselves.I emphasize that Hayles’ characterization leaves room for the question of “What is a human being?” and it seems to me that the inclusion of Neil Badmington’s “Posthumanism” is a good way of illustrating the power of the issue just mentioned, for it seems that if one wanted to the question “What a is human being?” with a form of as the one could that to that is, the possibility of an to that question will on a of boundaries that are In this ideas are in the of in her of the and in of when the technologies of the the of what is a human being would be and our current idea is by itself in the face of what is different from an and one who would be as an existence that these limits or and even on the ideas of one could as an entity in the process of his own allows to extend the limits of our embodied human one I believe does in her an of to on indications in order to allow such as to generate for a methodological debate with humanism. I then, that of is an excellent of how posthumanism is capable of confronting humanism. also and assumptions into question, and this is it necessary to reconsider the elements that had been by the humanist perspective, namely on an capable of the from which we can understand ourselves in order to understand ourselves as of the world and neither nor from nor from its descriptive In a and to we could say that when “What the of posthumanism with that posthumanism is “a of that is, to ourselves no longer from the of but to do on new that can the limits that humanism on out the of a one wonder this approach could have in the It seems to me that an to this question should be a and about this is what we find at the end of this section. In the excerpt from The we find the of “a posthuman in the when a is the of the I believe that this exercise is necessary even if one does not the of since could it even to us in a of ethical that for the complexities and actual of the to and more than on the of all that has been presented However, one can the humanist and ask “What of the if at we say is is the question that could configure the of this section, a by text a text that is not only because it is a between Nietzschean and and but also because it a of that like humanism and itself in that are still of ourselves at their However, seems to that the possibility of thinking beyond the of the in the need to in a way, which is in her perspectives have been an overcoming of what we are by of and an overcoming of what we are by of a And one may what is transhumanism overcome its and itself with posthumanist This question that I ask is even a personal as I would like to do research on this topic and the possibility that a form of transhumanism capable of care of is to of itself about its doubting and give birth to new without naively limits such as in science or is The Reader do not mean as an one last overcoming of our human the proposal by both Stefan Lorenz Sorgner and the last section the book with a proposal that in of one of the that has been a of this the that philosophical reflection can can it not if in his “The of and the and in a that the of transhumanism are the and and its of the and affirms the and not only firm in this but also takes the ideas of and and a philosophy of I were to present a of his I would say that is an an for an politics in which it makes no to the what we can think is already the future is and of believe that the intuition the word may be the to understanding for that can be in of this new way of thinking is no longer thought out as a to philosophical rather, is a on a Nietzschean that, now without without concepts such as and which the of a new of ourselves, and not the of and that can us in the still present and in the in the last Reader text, I would like to point out that, in my view, Sorgner presents at ideas for namely and by ourselves to our through a of and could we and in this of that we cannot step into do I this in several This Reader is a guide to get into philosophy. I would like to have the to this content in my in the near future. I am to be able to point out that, beyond the different perspectives in this Reader, what its is an ethical toward we are not able to on ourselves and our existence how can we even begin to face the that are is only a of the of not thinking about ourselves beyond In this last sense, this Reader will be a of the people who to give an to the very same that will how we will live in the near future.