Vulnerability Analysis of Decentralized File Systems Using Ethereum, IPFS, and MetaMask

Abstract

Decentralized file systems (DFS) offer secure and transparent and resilient data storage through the integration of peer-to-peer storage protocols and blockchain technologies. Such systems are, nevertheless, vulnerable to a range of threats to security at an application, smart-contract, or network level. We present a profound discussion of the weaknesses of a DFS developed based on IPFS as a file-storing engine, Ethereum as metadata storage, and MetaMask as authentication in this paper. With a combination of tools of superior quality in security-related analyses, like Slither, MythX, and Metasploit, we model attack-related situations in the form of reentrancy, content poisoning, and Sybil, as well as phishing. The evidence highlights the main threats, with chief ones being contract-logic defects, file-integrity breaks and session socialists. We suggest the relevant countermeasures, including the best practices in smart-contract writing, cryptographic assurance of content identifiers (CIDs), strong session management, and defences against nodes. The findings provide a security benchmark to system developers and researchers keen on enhancing the robustness of decentralized systems of storage.