Maimonides, Averroes, and Samuel Ibn Tibbon on a Skandalon of Medieval Science

Abstract

Maimonides, Averroes, and Samuel Ibn Tibbon on a Skandalon of Medieval Science Carlos Fraenkel (bio) Joel Kraemer has recently made an interesting contribution to the ongoing debate about Maimonides’ stance in Guide 2:24 on what has been called a skandalon of medieval science:1 the incompatibility of Ptolemy’s astronomy with Aristotle’s celestial physics.2 As I understand it, the main thesis for which Prof. Kraemer argues is twofold: (1) He proposes that it is possible that the emendation suggested by Ibn Tibbon to the crucial passage in 2:24 reflects the correct Arabic original. The absence of textual evidence does not disprove this possibility, because only a fraction of the Arabic manuscripts have been examined. In addition, even if no extant Arabic manuscript contains Ibn Tibbon’s [End Page 195] version, this would not be conclusive proof that his emendation does not reflect the correct Arabic text, since it may depend on a lost branch of the Arabic manuscript tradition. (2) Considerations of content, as well as the interpretative tradition of the Guide, make it likely that Ibn Tibbon’s version is the correct one despite contrary evidence of all known Arabic manuscripts.3 In his paper Prof. Kraemer also discusses a number of alternative interpretations, including the interpretation set forth by Zev Harvey and taken up by myself. In what follows I will defend the interpretation proposed by Harvey and myself. I will first address the philological argument in support of the possibility of Ibn Tibbon’s reading. Then I will briefly discuss the value of the interpretative tradition. Finally, I will turn to the substantive issues at stake. Concerning the substantive issues, let me note from the outset that there may not actually be a fundamental disagreement between us. If I am not mistaken, Prof. Kraemer agrees that Maimonides did not consider Aristotle’s physical proof of God a demonstrative proof according to the conditions stipulated by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics.4 Harvey and I think that this is the conclusion of Maimonides’ argument in 2:24: because of the incompatibility of Ptolemy’s astronomy with Aristotle’s celestial physics, the crucial premise of the eternal motion of the celestial spheres cannot be taken to be necessarily true. As a consequence, the physical proof of God is not a demonstrative proof. Prof. Kraemer, on the other hand, thinks that the “general proof [al-istidlāl al-ʿāmm]” mentioned in the controversial passage means “dialectical proof.”5 Without Ibn Tibbon’s emendation, Maimonides would thus be denying that the heavens provide a dialectical proof of God. If this were the case Prof. Kraemer would be right: the argument of 2:24 does not support such a conclusion. Hence Ibn Tibbon’s emendation would be plausible, since for a dialectical proof the premise of the eternal motion of the celestial spheres does not need to be necessarily true. It is sufficient for it to be likely true. And there are [End Page 196] good reasons to think that according to Maimonides’ esoteric position Aristotle’s view is more likely than the view that the world was created in time, i.e., the view for which he argues exoterically. If Maimonides had written what Ibn Tibbon and Prof. Kraemer—albeit for different reasons—think he should have, I would be happy to accept Prof. Kraemer’s interpretation that in the controversial passage Maimonides is referring to a dialectical proof. Indeed, in my view this would be the only philosophically tenable interpretation. I will argue, however, that Maimonides does not deny that the heavens provide a dialectical proof of God and that this is not what Ibn Tibbon took him to be denying. According to the interpretation maintained by Harvey and myself, in the controversial passage Maimonides denies that the physical proof is a demonstrative proof, thus implicitly acknowledging that it has only dialectical status. While the conclusion—that for Maimonides the proof is not demonstrative but dialectical—does not seem to conflict with Prof. Kraemer’s view, the interpretation itself has the advantage of not depending on an unnecessary emendation of the text. 1. Ibn Tibbon’s Reading and the Interpretative Tradition I agree with Prof. Kraemer...