Libel Law

Abstract

Abstract Dissatisfaction with the law of libel has been prevalent for some time. Critics have pointed to three areas in particular as requiring reform. First, they have said that rules of pleading in libel actions are unnecessarily arcane and that the interlocutory process is unduly complex. Secondly, it is said that awards of damages are out of proportion to the loss suffered. One consequence is that defendants have in general thrown more legal resources into litigation, which in turn has increased the costs penalty for the unsuccessful litigant. A third criticism is that the balance between plaintiff and defendant, both procedurally and in relation to the burden of proof, may be tilted too far in the plaintiff’s favour. (The suggestion that, perhaps, the burden of proof ought to be reversed and placed on the plaintiff has gained increased respectability, though it has not convinced everyone.) An important incidental effect of these deficiencies in the law, say critics, is that recourse to law is too complex and expensive. The result is that, at one extreme, the impecunious plaintiff may be deprived of a remedy and, on the other hand, with so much at stake financially for the unsuccessful defendant, the law may fetter freedom of speech.