Research and Implementation of Improved DPoS Consensus Mechanism

Abstract

To solve the concerns of malicious node removal and node corruption caused by idle node voting and long election cycles of the Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) consensus process, a new solution is proposed. First, we design a time-cost-based incentive mechanism that provides commensurate compensation to all nodes participating in the consensus strive system nodes to participate in voting actively. Second, we present a reward and punishment scheme based on trust value that sets the node status and corresponding trust value for nodes and dynamically adjusts the node status and associated trust value by monitoring node behavior and provides the function Optimization is performed to make it more difficult for bad nodes to get votes, to speed up the removal of wicked nodes, and to resist node bribery attacks. Finally, a list of alternate witness nodes is included to address the issue of system security weakening caused by the vacancy of hostile nodes once their proxies are revoked. The experimental results before and after the mechanism modification are compared to validate the usability and effectiveness of the improvement scheme.