MODEL FOR APPLYING ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS TO ENSURE CONFIDENTIAL AUTHENTICATION AND ACCESS CONTROL IN ENTERPRISE INFORMATION-INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS

Abstract

The paper investigates the problem of ensuring confidentiality in authentication processes within enterprise information-intelligent systems under increasing cybersecurity threats and growing requirements for data protection. The introduction substantiates the relevance of modern cryptographic approaches that minimize the transmission of sensitive information during user authentication. The literature review analyzes approaches to constructing zero-knowledge proofs, which enable verification of a statement without revealing secret data, including succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge, transparent scalable arguments of knowledge, and compact proof systems without trusted setup. Their cryptographic properties, trust assumptions, scalability, and computational characteristics are examined. In the methodology section, an adaptive authentication model is proposed, based on the integration of cryptographic proofs with risk assessment mechanisms and contextual access analysis. A formal decision-making model for access control is developed, taking into account user parameters, environmental characteristics, and threat levels, enabling dynamic selection of the proof type depending on the current risk level. An authentication algorithm is designed, including stages of identification, context evaluation, proof generation, and verification. In the results section, a comparative analysis of different types of zero-knowledge proofs in enterprise systems is conducted, evaluating their impact on performance, security level, and resistance to attacks. It is shown that the adaptive approach ensures a balance between cryptographic strength and computational efficiency. The conclusions justify the feasibility of implementing the proposed model as part of modern continuous access verification concepts and as a means of improving enterprise information security.