THE PARADIGM OF DECENTRALIZED ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT: A BLOCKCHAIN-BASED APPROACH

Abstract

The article provides a comprehensive study of the systemic transformation of corporate governance in the context of global digitalization, characterized by the transition from hierarchical models to decentralized structures. It is substantiated that blockchain technology emerges as a new institutional foundation, where traditional bureaucratic verification mechanisms are replaced by algorithms based on cryptographic protocols. A particular emphasis is placed on the distinctions between public (permissionless) and private (permissioned) blockchain networks regarding the immutability of records. The study examines the concept of decentralized governance and the functional specifics of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), where operational logic and management regulations are implemented directly into the software code of smart contracts. This minimizes the influence of traditional administrative management and mitigates "single point of failure" risks. The theoretical framework of the work builds upon classical theories, such as Oliver Williamson’s "Transaction Cost Theory," Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s "Principal-Agent Theory," and the scholarly works of Harold Demsetz. Blockchain is analyzed as a tool that renders market exchange more economically viable than hierarchy. The author proposes an original interpretation of a multi-tier blockchain model for enterprise management, encompassing the infrastructure, network, consensus, data, and application layers. The essence of consensus algorithms (PoW, PoS, DPoS) is disclosed through the prism of management. Special attention is devoted to international experience in legal regulation and the processes of implementing these standards within the legislative framework of Ukraine. The economic effect and practical aspects of the study are analyzed through successful case studies of global corporations (IBM, Amazon, Oracle, Walmart, Nestlé) and Ukrainian business initiatives (TASCOMBANK, SETAM, Agroxy, Softengi). These cases demonstrate a significant reduction in verification costs, lower operating expenses, and increased transparency in supply chains. The transition to an innovative "Management-as-a-Service" paradigm is justified, where blockchain serves not merely as software but as a new firm architecture. Conclusions are drawn regarding a shift in the management ontology – moving from "governance by humans" to algorithmic "governance by code," which ensures data immutability, cyber resilience, and the possibility of real-time preventive risk monitoring. References: 1. Kuzmina, T. O., Berezovskyi, Yu., Kalinskyi, Ye., Arliukova, Yu., & Trofymchuk, A. (2024). 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