Decentralization of crisis, weakness and responsibility

Abstract

Crises frequently weaken subnational governments but in some cases they lead to greater decentralization. Does this decentralization, however, support the search for optimal crisis response strategies? Generally speaking there are several arguments, which suggest that decentralized systems will manage crises better than centralized ones. This article, however, considers two scenarios (decentralization of weakness and decentralization of responsibility) where the apparently increasing autonomy of subnational governments leads to important problems. Decentralization of weakness emerges when the central government for certain reasons refuses to actively implement an anti-crisis policy. Under these conditions, regional measures, while to some extent compensating the inactivity of the central government, create a number of other problems - that of external effects, possible ideologization of politics and insufficient use of expert knowledge. Decentralization of responsibility emerges when regions accept responsibility for implementing anti-crisis measures, but the center keeps control over resources - thus, regions have to focus on competing for central financing. For the modern Russia, the risks of these two scenarios are substantial.