A Novel Zero-Knowledge Authentication Protocol for Secure Communication in VANET

Abstract

Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) is a particular subclass of the mobile ad-hoc network that raises several security challenges, notably how users authenticate the network. The work explores using zero-knowledge proofs for secure authentication while preserving user privacy and aims at encrypted information exchange between onboard units. Zero-knowledge proofs enhance security by protecting against impersonation attacks. We strive to reduce the dependence on roadside units for computational tasks by integrating the central authentication server and sub-authentication servers. We reduce modular exponentiation operations during authentication, enhancing efficiency without compromising security. We use the protocol verifier tool called Proverif to verify the security of our protocol. Simulation using the NS-2 simulator validates the protocol by varying the vehicle density. This paper advances VANET security by combining zero-knowledge authentication with encrypted information exchange, strengthening security, efficiency, and data confidentiality while reducing reliance on RSUs. Our protocol ensures secure communication in VANET with minimum computational and communication overhead.