Zero Knowledge Proof in Vehicular Networks

Abstract

In the need for high-security mechanisms, Trust Management Systems (TMSs) are implemented in vehicular networks such as Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) and the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) to ensure reliable interactions between vehicles. These systems nowadays are a key factor in building up security by evaluating and managing trust relationships among network participants. However, TMSs are inherently very vulnerable to Trust Manipulation Attacks (TMA), where we find malicious nodes attempting to deceive trust models by exploiting their evaluation mechanisms. One critical variant of this attack involves malicious nodes creating multiple fake identities, known as the Sybil attack, to falsely reinforce their trustworthiness. This deception will totally mislead legitimate vehicles, manipulate the decision-making processes, and at the end compromise the overall security and reliability of the network. To address this challenge, we propose a Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP)-based trust authentication scheme that ensures each vehicle can prove its legitimacy without exposing sensitive information. Our approach can and will prevent attackers from fabricating multiple identities to manipulate trust values. By integrating cryptographic authentication with trust management, our method significantly strengthens security and ensures that only legitimate vehicles can participate in trust-based evaluations. Through simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed solution in reducing the risk of Sybil-based. The results indicate that our approach not only enhances security but also maintains efficient trust computation, making it a viable solution for real-world vehicular networks.