Pseudo Trust: Zero-Knowledge Based Authentication in Anonymous Peer-to-Peer Protocols

Abstract

Most of the current trust models in peer-to-peer (P2P) systems are identity based, which means that in order for one peer to trust another, it needs to know the other peer's identity. Hence, there exists an inherent tradeoff between trust and anonymity. To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no P2P protocol that provides complete mutual anonymity as well as authentication and trust management. We propose a zero-knowledge authentication scheme called pseudo trust (PT), where each peer, instead of using its real identity, generates an unforgeable and verifiable pseudonym using a one-way hash function. A novel authentication scheme based on zero-knowledge proof is designed so peers can be authenticated without leaking any sensitive information. With the help of PT, most existing identity-based trust management schemes become applicable in mutual anonymous P2P systems. We analyze the levels of security and anonymity in PT, and evaluate its performance using trace-driven simulations and a prototype implementation. The strengths of pseudo trust include the lack of need for a centralized trusted party or CA, high scalability and security, low traffic and cryptography processing overheads, and man-in-middle attack resistance. We aim for the pseudo trust design to be included in the P2P trust and anonymity context.