Impact of Saving Attacks on Blockchain Consensus

Abstract

Blockchain consensus, which enables nodes on a peer-to-peer network to agree on the same ledger history, is the core element of blockchain systems. In many blockchain systems, a node chosen as a block proposer, in accordance with the consensus protocol, generates a block, and each node chooses a chain to extend by a fork-choice rule. This study introduces saving attacks, a new kind of attack that prevents nodes from reaching a consensus. In saving attacks, the adversary “saves” its rights to propose blocks during a temporal consensus failure and utilizes them later to cause another consensus failure. As a result, the blockchain suffers from poor performance and high latency to block finalization. We study the effect of saving attacks on various fork-choice rules, including those that Ethereum 2.0 plans to employ.We simulate saving attacks on the longest-chain rule, Greedy Heaviest-Observed Sub-Tree (GHOST), latest-message-driven (LMD) GHOST, and fresh-message-driven (FMD) GHOST.We show that the saving attack has a very large negative impact on the consensus. For example, we observe that under a certain condition, an adversary with 30% of the total stake that has saved its blocks for 32 minutes succeeds in preventing a consensus against LMD GHOST for 83 minutes in the context of Ethereum 2.0. We also show that FMD GHOST decreases the attack duration to approximately 6.4 minutes under the same conditions. Our results are applicable to all slot-based proof-of-stake blockchains, not just Ethereum 2.0.