Security Analysis of a Fork-Delay-Based Coalition Policy Algorithm for Improving Proof-of-Stake Consensus in Delay-Tolerant IoET Networks

Abstract

Exploration equipment for extreme environments like the Antarctic region constraints in power consumption, size, and weight. Furthermore, unmanned mobile exploration in environments with distributed IoET (Internet of Extreme Things) nodes requires long-range, delay-tolerant wireless communication. For these extreme environments, delay-tolerant communication systems can consider distributed ledgers as a way to record gains and losses to ensure coalition and reliability among nodes. However, Proof-of-Work (PoW), the most widely studied method for securing distributed ledger reliability, is simple to operate but highly energy-consumption. Proof-of-Stake (PoS) offers an energy-efficient alternative. This paper assumes a partially Δ-synchronized distributed system model for security analysis in PoS and analyzes the impact of network delays on the system. This analysis is an interpretation to identify methods for securing stability against balance attacks in public systems from the perspective of a partially Δ-synchronized model. The proposed technique is a game-theoretic approach that uses honest nodes to form a coalition to control delay. This study investigates the possibility of expanding the upper bound of the security region according to the attacker's occupation rate in a balanced attack by controlling the time delay required for nodes in a partially Δ-synchronized communication network to transmit messages to each other.