THE LEGAL STATUS AND REGULATION OF DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONS (DAOS) IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

Abstract

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), novel organizational structures governed by smart contracts on a blockchain, present a profound challenge to established legal paradigms. Designed to be borderless, transparent, and autonomous, DAOs operate in inherent conflict with a global legal system predicated on territorial jurisdiction and centralized authority. This article provides an exhaustive analysis of the treatment of DAOs under private international law (PIL). It begins by examining the fundamental crisis of legal categorization, where „unwrapped” DAOs face a default classification as general partnerships, imposing unlimited personal liability on their members—a risk starkly illustrated by landmark litigation such as CFTC v. Ooki DAO. The analysis then delves into the core tenets of PIL, demonstrating the inadequacy of traditional connecting factors for determining jurisdiction and applicable law in a decentralized context and exploring the formidable challenges of enforcing judgments against on-chain assets. Through a comprehensive comparative analysis of emerging regulatory frameworks in the United States (Wyoming), the European Union (MiCA), Switzerland (DLT Act), Liechtenstein (Blockchain Act), and the United Kingdom (Law Commission proposals), this article maps the fragmented global response. It argues that the adoption of „legal wrappers” is not merely a corporate structuring choice but a strategic PIL maneuver to preempt legal uncertainty. The article concludes that the legal landscape is evolving from a simple question of „what is a DAO?” to a complex, second-generation PIL problem of „which DAO law applies?” It posits that the future lies not in the triumph of code over law, but in a hybrid synthesis, and calls for international cooperation to develop coherent principles that can guide the integration of these transformative entities into the global legal order.