PoS-CoPOR: Proof-of-Stake Consensus Protocol with Native Onion Routing Providing Scalability and DoS-Resistance

Abstract

Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus protocols often face a trade-off between performance and security. Protocols that preelect leaders for subsequent rounds are vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, which can disrupt the network and compromise liveness. In this work, we present PoS-CoPOR, a single-chain PoS consensus protocol that mitigates this vulnerability by integrating a native onion routing mechanism into the consensus protocol itself. PoS-CoPOR combines stake-weighted probabilistic leader election with an anonymization layer that conceals the network identity of the next block proposer. This approach prevents targeted DoS attacks on leaders before they produce a block, thus enhancing network resilience. We implemented and evaluated PoS-CoPOR, demonstrating its ability to achieve a throughput of up to $110 \mathrm{tx} / \mathrm{s}$ with 6 nodes, even with the overhead of the anonymization layer. The results show that native anonymization can provide robust DoS resistance with only a modest impact on performance, offering a solution to build secure and scalable PoS blockchains.