Resettable Zero-Knowledge

Abstract

We introduce the notion of Resettable Zero-Knowledge (rZK), a new security measure for cryptographic protocols which strengthens the classical notion of zero-knowledge. In essence, an rZK protocol is one that remains zero knowledge even if an adversary can interact with the prover many times, each time resetting the prover to its initial state and forcing it to use the same random tape. Under general complexity assumptions, which hold for example if the Discrete Logarithm Problem is hard, we construct (non-constant round) Resettable Zero-Knowledge proof-systems for NP constant-round Resettable Witness-Indistinguishable proof-systems for NP constant-round Resettable Zero-Knowledge arguments for NP in the public key model: where veriers have fixed, public keys associated with them. In addition to shedding new light on what makes zero knowledge possible (by constructing ZK protocols that use randomness in a dramatically weaker way than before), rZK has great relevance to applications. Firstly, we show that rZK protocols are closed under parallel and