Replay Attacks and Defenses Against Cross-shard Consensus in Sharded\n Distributed Ledgers

Abstract

We present a family of replay attacks against sharded distributed ledgers,\nthat target cross-shard consensus protocols, such as the recently proposed\nChainspace and Omniledger. They allow an attacker, with network access only, to\ndouble-spend or lock resources with minimal efforts. The attacker can act\nindependently without colluding with any nodes, and succeed even if all nodes\nare honest; most of the attacks can also exhibit themselves as faults under\nperiods of asynchrony. These attacks are effective against both shard-led and\nclient-led cross-shard consensus approaches. Finally, we present Byzcuit - a\nnew cross-shard consensus protocol that is immune to those attacks. We\nimplement a prototype of Byzcuit and evaluate it on a real cloud-based testbed,\nshowing that our defenses impact performance minimally, and overall performance\nsurpasses previous works.\n