Threshold Decryption and Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Lattice-Based Cryptosystems

Abstract

Abstract. We present a variant of Regev’s cryptosystem first presented in [Reg05], but with a new choice of parameters. By a recent classical re-duction by Peikert we prove the scheme semantically secure based on the worst-case lattice problem GapSVP. From this we construct a threshold cryptosystem which has a very efficient and non-interactive decryption protocol. We prove the threshold cryptosystem secure against passive adversaries corrupting all but one of the players, and againts active ad-versaries corrupting less than one third of the players. We also describe how one can build a distributed key generation protocol. In the final part of the paper we show how one can, in zero-knowledge- prove knowledge of the plaintext contained in a given ciphertext from Regev’s original cryptosystem or our variant. The proof is of size only a constant times the size of the public key. 1