Pistis: Issuing Trusted and Authorized Certificates With Distributed Ledger and TEE

Abstract

The security of HTTPS fundamentally relies on SSL/TLS certificates issued by Certificate Authorities (CAs), which, however, are vulnerable to be compromised to issue unauthorized certificates (i.e., certificates issued without domains’ permission). Current countermeasures such as Certificate Transparency (CT) can only detect unauthorized certificates rather than preventing them. In this article, we presentPistis, a framework for issuing authorized and trusted certificates with the distributed ledger and Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) technology. InPistis, TEE nodes validate whether the domain in a requested certificate passes the domain ownership validation (i.e., under corresponding applicants’ control) and submit attested results to a smart contract in the distributed ledger. The smart contract issues a certificate to the applicant when an attested result shows a pass. Therefore,Pistiscan ensure its issued certificates are authorized due to the domain ownership validation mechanism in the TEE. Furthermore, as the issued certificates are stored in a Merkle Patricia Tree (MPT) inPistis, they are trusted and can be verified by a normal user easily. The security ofPistisis formally proved in the Universally Composable (UC) framework. Compared with state-of-the-art,Pistisavoids potential damages by preventing unauthorized certificates from issuing.